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History, Memory and Forgetting: Political Implications
*
 
Researchers have raised questions about recovering traumatic situations such as the Holocaust, 
the bombing of Hiroshima, the Vietnam war or the fratricidal massacres in Yugoslavia. Although 
some classic studies have identified important aspects relating to history and memory, there are 
several ways of dealing with the past, all of which involve interests, power and exclusion. The 
politics of just memory with regard to crimes committed in the past, a debate in which various 
academic areas as well as society in general have been involved, depends on processes of 
selection and also on elements which extend beyond the scope of human reason. It is necessary 
to find a balance between an obsession with the past and attempts to impose forgetting. Our aim, 
therefore, is to extend our understanding of history, memory and forgetting, emphasizing their 
limits as well as their ethical and moral implications.  




The aim of this article is to investigate the impasses between memory and forgetting that 
are present in debates on the preservation and dissemination of archives associated with 
conflicts, wars and periods of political oppression. The debate on justice for crimes 
committed in the past, in which various academic areas as well as society in general have 
been involved, is greatly aided by documents and testimonies, although it is not solely 
dependent on them. However, societies do not always choose to remember. Our aim, 
clearly, is not to devote this entire discussion to remembering and forgetting, but rather to 
extend our understanding of these terms, and this also implies establishing their limits.  
The first part of this article is based on the work of sociologists, historians and 
philosophers such as Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Nora and Paul Ricoeur on collective 
memory. Historical narratives that preside over the organisation of archives, collections and 
museums remind us of what has passed or, in other words, what is no longer present 
amongst us. However, they do not reveal an absolute truth; instead they lead us to the 
process of constructing collections on the basis of conflicting interests. Memory operates as 
a selective process and may become a political weapon for the victims of war and genocide 
when forgetting has established its hegemony. 
                                                 
*
 Article published in RCCS 79 (December 2007). 
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The second part of this article deals with cases in which more than one selective process 
is involved in what is to be remembered. Authors such as Georges Bataille and Max Scheler 
present situations in which individuals and communities may be incapable of conveying what 
they have learned from experience and pain when looking back at the past. Memory does 
not merely obey reason, since it is also related to inherited traditions which form part of our 
identity and which we cannot control and, in addition, to deep feelings such as love, hate, 
humiliation, pain and resentment, which emerge independently of our will.  
As a result of these challenges, the third part of this article presents various historical 
situations in which alternatives are being constructed with the aim of overcoming the 
distance between the past and the present and to establish an agenda in which 
remembering is linked to the possibility of forgetting.  
 
1. The selective process of memory 
Maurice Halbwachs was the first sociologist to redeem the topic of memory for the field of 
social interaction.1 Rejecting the idea current at the time that memory was the result of the 
impression of real events on the human mind, he established the thesis that people weave 
their memories together on the basis of the various forms of interaction that they engage in 
with other individuals. Therefore, certain memories are repeated within the family, others 
among workers in a factory and so on. As individuals do not belong only to one group but are 
involved in multiple social relationships, the individual differences in each memory express 
the ƌesults of eaĐh peƌsoŶ’s tƌajeĐtoƌǇ thƌoughout theiƌ liǀes. IŶdiǀidual ŵeŵoƌǇ oŶlǇ ƌeǀeals 
the complexities of the social interrelations experienced by each person.  
The geneƌal ŵeƌit of HalďǁaĐhs’ ǁoƌk, theƌefoƌe, ǁas to shoǁ that iŶdiǀidual ŵeŵoƌǇ 
cannot be separated from collective memories. The individual alone does not have control 
over recovering the past. Memory is formed by individuals interacting with each other and 
by social groups, and individual memories are the result of this process. Even though the 
individual may think that their memory is strictly personal, as it recalls events in which only 
they were involved or facts and objects which only they witnessed and experienced, it is, in 
fact, collective since the individual, even if alone, is the product of social interactions and 
                                                 
1
 Maurice Halbwachs established the main theoretical arguments in support of the collective nature of memory 
in two books that are nowadays considered standard reference works on the subject, Les cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire (1925) and La mémoire collective, the latter published posthumously (1950). 
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views the world through collective constructs such as language. If lost in the same desert, 
two individuals from different cultural traditions will have different memories, descriptions 
and feelings associated with their experiences. These will not, strictly speaking, be individual 
since, as Halbwachs affirms, the individual is never alone.  
In making memory the subject of the social sciences HalďǁaĐhs ƌeiteƌates Duƌkheiŵ’s 
argument on the predominance of collective over individual consciousness. This emphasis by 
Halbwachs on collective representations has been theoretically counterbalanced by others 
who have investigated the involvement of social agents in interactive processes. Memory, 
tradition and history are conceived by some authors to be collective representations actively 
formed by social actors. The collection of articles compiled by David Middleton and Derek 
Edwards consolidates the interactionist approach to studies on collective memory 
(Middleton and Edwards, 1990). Yet, despite the diffeƌeŶĐes, ďoth HalďǁaĐhs’s study of the 
social frameworks for memory and the interactionist approaches to collective memory show 
that neither historical truth nor spontaneous memory really exist.  
Aware of these concerns, in the 1980s Nora edited an anthology of articles in which the 
authoƌs eǆploƌed ͞plaĐes of ŵeŵoƌǇ͟ iŶ FƌaŶĐe oƌ, iŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, sǇŵďoliĐ plaĐes made by 
and making the French nation. The objects of study were not documentary sources or 
individual memories but evidence from past eras, including the founding of museums, 
archives, cemeteries, celebrations, collections and so on. Also relevant for the debate on 
collective memory was the distinction made by Nora between history and memory (Nora, 
1984). In his introduction to the anthology, nowadays considered a standard reference work 
for studies in this area, Nora contrasts different approaches to the past. In his opinion, 
history corresponds to a modern acceleration of time, meaning that events are perceived as 
ephemeral, transitory and belonging to a homogenous time. He points out the limits of this 
historiography, which he describes as a logical and linear narrative, devoid of any content 
relating to the past. In contrast to history, collective memories are linked to ongoing 
movements and recollections transmitted from one generation to another. Nevertheless, 
they also have their limitations in terms of understanding the past, since individuals are not 
aware that their own perceptions transform the past. Individual or collective memory is 
vulnerable to manipulation (Nora, 1984; Davis and Starn, 1989) and therefore both history 
and memory are limited in their access to the past.  
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In the distinction he makes between history and memory, Nora contextualises the 
different ways of looking at the past. He shows that, with modernity, perceptions of time 
and historical narratives follow the processes of time acceleration. Walter Benjamin, in his 
reflections on history, had already pointed out the limits of the historical approach which 
listed facts and events over homogenous time. Benjamin understood that the transmission 
of collective representations from individual to individual over time and space would 
become increasingly sparse and discontinuous (Benjamin, 1968). Another important author 
in terms of contextualizing historical narratives was the German historian Reinhart Koselleck. 
IŶ his ǀieǁ, ŵodeƌŶitǇ is diffeƌeŶtiated ďǇ the ĐoŶĐept of the ͞Ŷeǁ,͟ which makes each 
moment unique and independent in relation to those which preceded it. The modern world 
is distinguished from the old because it is full of singular characteristics and is always open 
to the possibility of the future. This ͞tiŵe futuƌe,͟ independent of everyday experience 
constructed over centuries, entails a break between the present and the past and banishes 
everything that has gone before it (Koselleck, 1985).  
The belief in this hiatus between past and present and in the ongoing reconstruction of 
the past by the present is taken to its extreme by scholars exploring the concept of 
detraditionalisation. Authors such as Anthony Giddens (1990), Ulrich Beck et al. (1994) and 
Scott Lash (1998) argue that contemporary individuals possess great autonomy in relation to 
traditions, being detached and free to engage in new experiences. For them, contemporary 
societies are characterised by an accelerated pace of change, and the uniqueness of 
individuals is defined by their distance from collective past experiences. In contrast to 
BeŶjaŵiŶ’s pessiŵisŵ, theǇ ďelieǀe that the ŵoƌe uŶstaďle aŶd shiftiŶg soĐial iŶteƌaĐtioŶs 
are, the more important individual actions or, in other words, their capacity for choice and 
decision-making, become. In this context, historical narratives reflect an ongoing process of 
selection and reconstruction of traces of the past.2 Therefore, for these authors both history 
and memory deal with the discontinuity of modern time. Obviously there are still authors 
who believe in communication between past and present. The French philosopher Paul 
RiĐœuƌ ǁas aďle Ŷot oŶlǇ to ĐoŶteǆtualise ďut also to skilfullǇ iŶteƌǁeaǀe ŵeŵoƌǇ, histoƌǇ 
and forgetting. In his view, memory is an ongoing task that is always able to superimpose 
itself on pre-estaďlished stƌuĐtuƌal pƌoĐesses ;RiĐœuƌ, ϮϬϬϬͿ.  
                                                 
2
 For a critique of detraditionalisation, see Santos, 1998. 
RCCS Annual Review, 1, September 2009                                                                                                                       History, Memory and Forgetting 
 
81 
Our aim in this article is to show that there is a significant diversity of approaches to the 
past, almost all of which are permeated by tensions, conflicts and disputes. Memory, history 
and forgetting are necessary experiences which neither blend nor complement one another. 
Nowadays we find ourselves far removed from both the notion of history as a faithful record 
of the past and the reduction of memory to a kind of selective reconstruction of the past. 
Therefore, the fundamental step that must be taken is to understand that there is nothing 
natural in the reconstruction of the past.  
The building up of archives, the classification of data and the organisation of events and 
celebrations are activities involving memory that play an essential role in the society in 
which we live. At any given time there is always an ongoing and significant political struggle 
associated with the creation and preservation of archives relating to periods of domination 
and violence in which human rights were abused. Throughout the 20th century, the major 
demand of the victims of totalitarian and repressive governments found expression in 
movements to reclaim memory. Archives, artefacts and accounts of the past have been used 
as proof of a past that was deliberately forgotten in official versions of history, in an attempt 
to summon up everything that had been left in the limbo of history. Memory is therefore 
associated with those who wield power, since they decide which narratives should be 
remembered, preserved and disseminated.  
In Latin America in the 1980s, military dictatorships were succeeded by democratic 
governments. In various countries legislation was introduced to provide for amnesties and 
pardons, enabling former opponents of the regime to be reintegrated, but at the same time 
preventing the trial of those who had been responsible for torture and other barbaric 
crimes. It is only in recent years that the pacts for pardon and forgetting have begun to be 
reviewed. In 2006, for the first time in Brazil, victims of kidnapping and torture under the 
military regime, whose lives had been brutally maimed, questioned the Amnesty Law that 
had been passed in 1979.3 In Argentina, it is only in recent years that the so-called pardon 
laws have been questioned, and the courts have begun to review the crimes committed by 
                                                 
3
 The couple César Teles and Maria Amélia Teles, the sister of the latter, Criméia Almeida, and their two 
children, Janaína and Édson, began legal proceedings for moral and physical damages against an agent of the 
security forces in the 1970s, Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra. 
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state employees associated with the military dictatorship.4 This has also happened in 
Uruguay and Chile.5  
The various debates on truth and reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa can also be 
understood as the result of a tenuous political agreement that is seeking to establish itself. 
The power contained in memories is so strong and complex that even the opposition, when 
it comes into power, cannot always encourage remembrances of the past that have been 
repressed. In the midst of the hatred and resentment that accumulated over many 
generations, what can be remembered? As tools of power, memory and forgetting have 
been used by various governments, both totalitarian and democratic, in order to secure 
political control over opposing forces. Forgetting has therefore also served as a political 
strategy used by democratic governments at particular moments. The previous examples are 
important because they show us that the associations between memory, autonomy and 
liberty, on the one hand, and forgetting and authoritarianism on the other hand, cannot be 
generalised.  
The behaviour of the United States during the Vietnam War has not yet been properly 
and publicly debated in world forums, and it may be said that there is a lot to be 
remembered. The autobiography of Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense at the time, 
(2006), makes it clear that the many mistakes that were made have still not been properly 
judged. Those who supported the decisions to carry out a devastating massacre of 
Vietnamese civilians using napalm, toxic gases and bombing on a massive scale are still close 
to power. The moral blindness that still prevails today over Vietnam may be associated, on 
the one hand, with the continuity of the power of the United States in international affairs 
and, on the other hand, the inability of American society to distance itself from the crimes 
that have been committed. Archives and evidence are therefore undeniably important to the 
various opposing forces, and their political implications are significant in political disputes.  
 
                                                 
4
 Despite the strong movement of the ͞Motheƌs of the Plaza de MaǇo͟, it ǁas oŶlǇ iŶ ϮϬϬϱ that AƌgeŶtiŶa 
revoked the Full Stop and Due Obedience Laws, also known as the pardon laws, which were blocking 
proceedings against those responsible for violating human rights. In 2006, the courts ruled that the pardon 
granted to former president Jorge Rafael Videla was unconstitutional. In the same year, former policeman 
Miguel Etchecolatz, aged 77, was sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes he had committed during the 
military dictatorship. 
5
 In Uruguay, it was only in 2006, 21 years after the re-estaďlishŵeŶt of deŵoĐƌaĐǇ, that the PuďliĐ PƌoseĐutoƌ’s 
Office requested proceedings to be initiated against soldiers and policemen responsible for crimes committed 
during the military dictatorship. 
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2. Facing the impossibility of remembering the past 
As initially stated, not everything that relates to the past is the object of present-day 
negotiation. The latest historiographical approaches have made the search for the past more 
complex than just the interplay of present-day interests. Authors such as Hayden White, in 
abolishing the search for an original, non-linguistic presence, reduce all approaches to 
attempts at interpretation that are restricted to the domain of language.6 This not only 
relativises narratives concerning the nature of an event, but also their political implications. 
One of the characteristics of contemporary historiography is the systematic revision of 
political conflicts in the modern era. In France, in addition to revising major events 
associated with the French Revolution, the legacy of the Vichy government is constantly 
being reinterpreted.  
Some researchers also study memory in situations involving extreme aggression and 
violence. In this case, the inability of the victims to respond has been observed. Incapable of 
understanding the experiences they have lived through or of ascribing meaning to them, 
they become unable to use their memories selectively. Memory therefore cannot be 
reduced to a political tool; it extends beyond attempts to control it.  
Attempts to recover traumatic situations such as those which took place during the 
Holocaust, the bombing of Hiroshima, the Vietnam war, or the fratricidal massacres in 
Yugoslavia have had the disturbing effect of draining these catastrophic events of the sense 
of tragedy they contained in the past. In the words of Georges Bataille, revealing the effects 
of the Hiroshima bombing became the opposite of revealing the facts (Bataille, 1995: 228-
229). That is to say, human representation of this catastrophe is not capable of accurately 
conveying the dimensions of the event and, instead, has the perverse effect of making banal 
something that is not so. In his view, as there are no words to describe the horror, the 
feeling of horror cannot be the starting point for attempts to describe this horror (ibidem). In 
providing an explanation of what has happened, the history that is recounted serves to 
justify unjustifiable violence and banish it from the collective imagination.  
The possibility of representing reality is always a challenge. We may understand that 
there are no words to describe horror and that those who try to explain it end up by 
eliminating any possibility of facing or repairing the tragedy. Individuals find refuge in action, 
but do not always resolve problems related to violence and suffering, which are basic 
                                                 
6
 See White (1987), amongst others. 
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components of human life. Researchers in various academic areas have been involved in 
studying the possibilities of reconstructing and explaining trauma.  
Freud and Lacan have both shown in their own way that individuals do not have full 
control over their memories; they may return to them repeatedly without any desire on 
their part for this to happen, or they may disappear without the option of recall. For Freud, 
trauma is a consequence either of the devastating nature of an event or the psychic 
apparatus of the individual, which may not be prepared to respond to certain stimuli (Freud, 
1955). When a particularly powerful stimulus acts on us, we may not be capable of 
responding to it. It breaks down our protective barriers to become part of our actual being 
and we are not able to defend ourselves against it. Our self-awareness fails. This explains the 
nightmares that repeatedly return, leaving individuals drained and unable to defend 
themselves. Past aggression returns in flashbacks, nightmares and other similar phenomena; 
it is the cause of certain symptoms, namely repetitive actions that aim to reduce the stress 
caused by the initial aggression.  
In addition, the works of Nietzsche and Scheler help us to understand attitudes that 
overstep every moral limit that can be expected of human beings. Memory and forgetting 
also involve ethical and moral issues. Scheler, in his study on resentment, indicates how 
profound experiences related to suffering and humiliation can lead to a highly contagious 
feeling of vengeance and rancour (Scheler and Frings, 1994). In relating a traumatic 
experience to the identity of its subject, we may see that his attitude towards the past does 
not revolve solely around the knowledge of what he has left behind. Memory cannot be 
considered only as a reconstructed past. It may make the individual relive an experience and 
evoke new desires and emotions that may be extremely negative and self-destructive. 
Returning to the past may include the possibility of understanding, but it equally revives 
feelings that had previously been repressed. Even if representation is possible, we must 
enquire whether it is desirable, and if it is possible to integrate the trauma into our lives in a 
connected rather than pathological manner.  
How do we respond, for example, to the issue raised by Taussig when he denounces the 
brutal decimation of the American Indians by the Spanish following their arrival in America? 
This anthropologist correctly argues that the conquest had already taken place and did not 
require such violence (Taussig, 1986). How are we to understand the Holocaust? How do we 
explain the massacre of the Tutsis in Rwanda? What can be said about the attitude of the 
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Serbs in Kosovo? The more historians search for explanations for barbarities that have been 
committed, the more these excesses seem to remain beyond our logical and rational 
comprehension.  
Some researchers believe that in cases of extreme violence there may be a direct 
relationship between event and representation. Like Bataille, Friedländer also argues that 
extreme violence has its own unique characteristics. The extermination of the Jews cannot 
be the object of theoretical discussion; it was a unique event and needs to be recorded as 
such. Since recollection of the traumatic event is, in most cases, extremely faithful and 
rigorous in its use of detail, it offers direct access to the real. Therefore, Friedländer believes 
that the Shoah, due to its excess, can be conveyed without distortion or banality. The 
extreme violence of the Holocaust has enabled historians to reorganise their understanding 
of the real. According to the author, siŶĐe eǆĐess is ďeǇoŶd the iŶdiǀidual’s iŵagiŶatiǀe aŶd 
representational capabilities, since it has no limits and is beyond representation, it speaks 
for itself (Friedländer, 1992). What the individual describes is not a construction of an event 
experienced in the past, but the event itself. Representation of the real without mediation is 
pƌeseŶt iŶ the testiŵoŶǇ of tƌauŵatiĐ situatioŶs. The eǀideŶĐe of the ͞pƌeseŶt͟ is possiďle 
because awareness has been deactivated.  
Archives, testimonies, statements and records are brought to light with the aim of 
conveying to future generations the absurdity of unnecessary violence. The Yad Vashem 
archives and memorial in Jerusalem contains the largest amount of information on the 
Holocaust in the world, and nowadays plays an important political role in denouncing and 
condemning those involved in the Hitler regime. Various other archives have a similar role. 
The International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims in Copenhagen also houses an 
important collection of statements and information on human rights violations that have 
occurred in more recent wars, such as those in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Organisations 
are founded to fight against the arbitrariness of oblivion by recovering names and restoring 
the facts that can still be remembered. The role of these archives is not to explain what 
cannot be explained, but to keep alive the memory of what cannot be repeated.  
We may therefore arrive at the conclusion that there is no final ruling on memory. In 
some cases forgetting may not only be a choice, but also a given fact. Moreover, despite the 
exceptional nature of traumatic situations, more than a few authors have identified them in 
ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ eǀeƌǇdaǇ life. Walteƌ BeŶjaŵiŶ’s desĐƌiption of the experience of shock is one 
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of the earliest and most powerful images of the modern individual, fragmented and unable 
to react to the stimuli he encounters (Benjamin, 1973).  
 
3. The response of the new historiography 
In recent years, contemporary historiography has sought to respond to the question posed 
by Georges Bataille. Historians working in the field of present-day history, and especially oral 
history, have been concerned with constructing a space within historical narrative in which 
subjectivity, feelings and human experience can be valued. This concern has translated, on 
the one hand, into ongoing efforts to uncover the most subtle and camouflaged forms of 
domination – very often established through the actual social process of constructing 
memory/ies - and, on the other hand, the salvaging of memories, experiences and existences 
that have been hidden and silenced. The new historiography gives a voice to those who do 
not feature in documentary records, enabling group histories to be recovered on a small 
scale. Through accounts constructed on the basis of the personal trajectory of each 
individual, which, though partial, contain depth and moral outlines associated with this 
subjectivity, they seek out elements that have evaded other forms of analysis (Thompson, 
1992).  
IŶ the teǆt ͞Memória, esquecimento, silêncio͟ [Memory, Forgetting, Silence] (1989) 
Michel Pollak draws our attention to the processes of domination and submission within 
different versions and memories, pointing out the rift between the dominant official 
ŵeŵoƌǇ aŶd the ͞uŶdeƌgƌouŶd ŵeŵoƌies͟ ŵaƌked ďǇ sileŶĐe, the uŶsaid aŶd ƌeseŶtŵeŶt. 
This rift may appear not only in relations between a dominating state and civil society, but 
also in relations between an inclusive society and minority groups. ͞Forbidden,͟ 
͞uŶspeakaďle͟ oƌ ͞shaŵeful͟ ŵeŵoƌies ǀeƌǇ ofteŶ ĐoŶtƌadiĐt the ŵost legitiŵate aŶd 
powerful of all collective memories: national memory.  
In this context, the research of Henri Rousso and Alessandro Portelli proves very 
interesting. Rousso studied the ͞fƌaŵiŶg͟ pƌoĐesses of the French national memory – 
involving concealment and political reconstruction, principally with regard to the Second 
World War, the Resistance and collaborationism. He shows that both collaboration and the 
Vichy government were relegated to the margins of the national memory, forgotten and, 
worse, concealed (Rousso, 1987).  
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Portelli, in a text well known to researchers working with oral history, studied the 
diffeƌeŶt ͞laǇeƌs͟ to the ŵeŵoƌǇ of a ŵassaĐƌe Đarried out by German soldiers in the small 
Italian city of Civitella. To the Italian government, Civitella was a symbol of resistance to 
fascism, and the anniversary of the massacre was commemorated with national honours. 
However, Portelli discovered an underground memory in the statements of local residents 
that had been hidden and was very different from the official memory. Surviving local 
residents felt that the massacre was due to the irresponsibility of partisan militants, who had 
killed some German officers and left the population exposed to Nazi vengeance. This local 
memory did not fit with the official memory which praised the heroism of the small town 
and was therefore concealed (Portelli, 1996).  
The warning given by the French historian Pierre Ansart (2001) applies perfectly to the 
studies pƌoduĐed ďǇ Rousso aŶd Poƌtelli: ͞We ŵust ĐoŶsideƌ the ƌaŶĐouƌ, eŶǀǇ, desiƌe foƌ 
vengeance and phantoms of death.͟ Ansart’s aiŵ is to iŶĐoƌpoƌate the ͞shadoǁǇ, distuƌďiŶg, 
fƌeƋueŶtlǇ teƌƌifǇiŶg͟ aspeĐts of past experience into historical narrative. Basing his 
arguments in particular on Nietzsche, Ansart proposes to researchers a history of 
resentment, a history which takes into account, for example, the experience of humiliation 
and fear as driving forces behind human action and reaction.  
These four authors engage with the political trauma resulting from genocide, dictatorship 
and tyranny. In our opinion, many important contributions to this theme have come from 
researchers involved in oral histoƌǇ, ǁoŵeŶ’s histoƌy and anthropology. We would now like 
to comment on some of these works – several of which are still in the research and 
conclusion stages.  
The first work we wish to analyse is that of Silvia Salvatici, an Italian researcher who is 
studying the impact of violence of the Kosovo war through oral statements supplied by 
immigrants. Two of her texts have been published in the Revista de História Oral: ͞Memórias 
de gênero: reflexões sobre a história oral de mulheres͟ [Gendered Memories: Reflections on 
WoŵeŶ’s Oƌal History] aŶd ͞Narrativas de violência no Kosovo do pós-guerra͟ [Narratives of 
Violence in Post-war Kosovo] (Salvatici, 2005a e 2005b). In the two works, which 
complement each other to a significant extent, Salvatici identifies an important issue: the 
new and revealing focus that is brought to bear on the construction of historical narrative 
thƌough ǁoŵeŶ’s stateŵeŶts. She eŵphasises the faĐt that oƌal histoƌǇ aŶd ǁoŵeŶ’s histoƌǇ 
have developed together and have mutually reinforced each other. Both emerged out of a 
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concern to salvage what had not been recorded for history and which, in most cases, relied 
only on testimony and oral statements to be remembered and understood. Both fields were 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith ƌesĐuiŶg this ͞voice of the past͟7 and giving it a place in history. For 
ƌeseaƌĐheƌs of oƌal histoƌǇ aŶd ǁoŵeŶ’s histoƌǇ this was a militant, political concern, and 
when both fields intersected, history actually encountered something new.  
In her empirical research, Salvatici shows us the richness of experiences marked by 
female subjectivity and gender-based behaviour and stances determined by a war situation. 
She reproduces the statements of women who had been in concentration camps, worked for 
the resistance and lived through civil wars, bringing to history a whole aspect of human 
experience in times of war and domination that had previously been unknown and hidden. 
Events and experiences involving rape, clandestine childbirth, abortion, care of the sick, 
protection of children, the hoarding of food, making of clothes or even disguises, and 
improvised ways of coping with cold and hunger in times of extreme scarcity now enter 
history. Other statements by women describe the experiences of clandestine love, kisses 
exchanged across the barricades, hasty marriages, lonely pregnancies, the joy of successful 
births in precarious circumstances. The romantic side to political activities in times of war is 
brought to light by oral accounts and statements by women. In short, they reveal a wide 
range of experiences and ways of confronting war and tyranny that were previously 
unknown and had not appeared in historical accounts and records, or even in the statements 
of individuals who had lived through these situations. Most of these statements had been 
provided by men and were based on male experiences in prisons, concentration camps and 
resistance groups. The typically female experience of these types of traumatic situations 
Đould oŶlǇ ďe highlighted thƌough a ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of oƌal histoƌǇ aŶd ǁoŵeŶ’s histoƌǇ. OŶlǇ iŶ 
this way was it possible for researchers to bring a dimension of human experience and 
existence to history that had been totally ignored because it was based on a female 
subjectivity excluded from historical narrative.  
Another historian who has raised important questions concerning the relationship 
between politics and subjectivity is the South African Jonathan Grossman. His teǆt ͞ViolêŶĐia 
e silêncio: Reescrevendo o futuro͟ [Violence and Silence: Rewriting the Future], also 
published in the Revista de História Oral, brings to light the dramatic consequences of a 
political process which attempted to ignore and, at certain moments, override the 
                                                 
7
 An expression coined by the English historian Paul Thompson, 1992. 
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suďjeĐtiǀities of the aĐtoƌs iŶǀolǀed iŶ the politiĐal histoƌǇ of “outh AfƌiĐa. GƌossŵaŶ’s teǆt 
analyses the political process of national reconciliation and the rebuilding of the social 
compact in the country after the apartheid regime ended. He focuses explicitly on the work 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, whose objective was to repair the damage 
caused to victims and develop a human rights policy (Grossman, 2000).  
Grossman raises an important point: the Commission looked on everyone who had 
suffered at the hands of the regime – through imprisonment, torture, clandestinity, ill 
treatment or humiliation – as victims. These people were called upon to make statements 
and describe before the Commission what they had suffered. Whilst not disagreeing with the 
importance of this work, Grossman draws attention to the fact that countless people, 
particularly young people, wanted to make statements to the Commission, but not as 
victims. They wanted to record their achievements in the struggle, the resistance, the fight. 
They did not feel they were victims, but rather heroes of combat. Yet there was no place for 
them; their statements were not wanted or recorded. The Commission was not looking for 
heroes, but victims. Many of these young people rejected being turned into victims, they did 
not regard themselves as such and did not want this role in history. However, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission provided no space for them and was not interested in this kind of 
historical record.  
GƌossŵaŶ dƌaǁs atteŶtioŶ to a politiĐal pƌoĐess that ͞plaĐes suffeƌiŶg oǀeƌ aŶd aďoǀe 
eŶgageŵeŶt aŶd politiĐal ƌesistaŶĐe͟: ͞As the focus is only on pain, people who have lived 
through the entire experience of survival and resistance end up being reduced simply to 
victims, and the fact that they also survived and resisted is Ŷot takeŶ iŶto aĐĐouŶt͟ (2000: 
19-20). There was a refusal on the part of these young people to accept the role of victim 
and a desire to affirm an identity linked to the idea of resistance. This subjectivity, for 
Grossman, was jettisoned from the post-apartheid political process and this was to fuel 
powerful currents of resentment in South African society, to the extent of dangerously 
compromising the success of the political reconciliation process.  
We should now like to comment on the relevance of another work – this time from the 
field of anthropology – which discusses the relationship between subjectivity and politics. 
The book by Kimberley Theidon, an anthropologist at Harvard University who has studied 
Peru for many years, is significantly entitled Entre Prójimos: el conflicto armado interno y la 
política de la reconciliación em el Peru (2004). The book deals with the armed conflict which 
RCCS Annual Review, 1, September 2009                                                                                                                       History, Memory and Forgetting 
 
90 
took place in Peru in the 1980s as a result of the political actions of the Sendero Luminoso 
(Shining Path) extremist group. It is based on fieldwork undertaken in Ayacucho, a region 
where the Peruvian armed conflict made the greatest number of victims, most of whom 
were from the indigenous population. Theidon studied seven indigenous communities who 
had suffered and inflicted suffering. Her starting point was that the inhabitants of the 
indigenous communities (and sometimes entire communities) felt constrained to ally 
themselves either with the senderistas or the Armed Forces. It was precisely this 
characteristic that conferred on the Peruvian armed conflict – at least in the Ayacucho 
region – the status of a civil war. It set peasants and Indians allied with Sendero Luminoso 
against peasants and Indians who supported the Armed Forces.  
The question that Theidon explored in her extensive fieldwork was that of civil 
participation in the killings and violence carried out and experienced by the indigenous 
peasant population: ͞How did people start killing those closest to them? How did everyday 
life and subjectivities become militarised and demilitarised?͟ (Theidon, 2004). This is the 
question posed in the preface to the book. Theidon specifically explores the question of the 
construction of subjectivity in times of civil war, the experience of social groups who have 
been politically abandoned, manipulated by guerrillas and the Armed Forces and involved in 
violent conflicts with neighbours, relatives and acquaintances. She explores despair and 
politics. It is interesting to note that the Peruvian armed conflict – the war between the 
Sendero and the Armed Forces that took place in Ayacucho – has only very recently become 
the object of historical and social research. Until just a short time ago this subject was an 
unbreakable taboo. Only now have accounts of this experience emerged and, even so, with 
great difficulty. Theidon describes the enormous problems she faced in obtaining oral 
statements about the war. Peasants and Indians did not want to talk – much less be 
recorded – about this subject. Very recently the subject has also been covered in Peruvian 
literature, a good example of which is the novel La hora azul by Alonso Cueto, which has 
already been translated and published in Brazil (2006). Peruvian society is beginning to take 
various steps towards reviewing the history of the war.  
As it is a history that has been stifled and, in various senses, kept a secret, Theidon points 
out the need to be able to decode various types of language in order to study this theme. 
From amongst these she identifies the language of the body: it is necessary to understand an 
experience culturally informed by the body, she tells us. The experience of the peasants and 
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Indians in this civil war – physical pain, torture, poverty and hunger – has been marked on 
the body. In her view, the body is a place of memory, a site in which important historical 
experiences are inscribed.  
The theoretical and methodological question which Theidon discusses in her work is 
precisely this incorporation of the construction of subjectivity into historical and 
anthropological studies, although this means more than just valuing subjectivity in historical 
narrative. She goes further, proposing that subjectivity should be incorporated as a research 
object and tool. Her aim is to investigate the body of people (her witnesses) – how they 
register and relate experiences of fear, pain, humiliation and also hope, happiness, relief and 
pleasure; in other words, all the feelings and emotions experienced during a war.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has focused on various approaches which have made an effective contribution 
towards constructing the notion we have today of what history, memory and forgetting are. 
Yet, as the philosopher Edward Casey tells us, whatever memory is, it exceeds the scope of 
human reason and resists being captured in the structure of intentionality. When we need to 
produce an exact description of memory, it is as if we found ourselves ͞adrift in a virtual 
Sargasso Sea of linguistic confusion and oďliǀioŶ͟ (Casey, 1987: 89).  
Faced with a range of approaches and political implications, we have aimed to emphasise 
that the problem for researchers exploring the past is not merely related to the search for 
knowledge, since it involves political and moral issues.8 MiĐhel FouĐault’s ĐƌitiƋue of histoƌǇ 
as a means of arbitrarily establishing origins, continuity or even finality in relation to power 
has given rise to a broad debate on the relationship between knowledge, morality and 
power (Foucault, 1977). Countless researchers have been involved in denouncing narratives 
which, although they reveal past facts and events to present generations, reproduce 
domination and forms of power. The so-called objectivity and neutrality of approaches 
which seek to reconstitute the past on the basis of scientific methods and rigorous standards 
may take shape as new forms of control.  
In short, by interweaving several interpretations of history, memory and forgetting we 
have aimed to show that there are various ways of dealing with the past, all of which involve 
                                                 
8
 See Seligmann-Silva, 2000, amongst others. 
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interests, power and exclusion. The politics of just memory needs to strike a balance 
between an obsession with the past and attempts to impose forgetting.  
Research into what has happened in the past – and the related theoretical and 
methodological debate – has sought in various ways to respond to the limits of 
representation. We hope – and are working to this end – that new paths will help us to know 
ourselves better, in an emancipatory and liberating sense. A history of human beings cannot 
be created by ignoring either the subjectivity of the human condition or its limits. This being 
the case, let us not let our knowledge of this subjectivity serve as a means to enable some 
people to create more efficient ways to control and dominate others – this is the pledge of 
the researchers we have considered during the course of our discussion.  
Translated by Sheena Caldwell 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
 
References 
AŶsaƌt, Pieƌƌe ;ϮϬϬϭͿ, ͞Históƌia e ŵeŵóƌia dos ƌesseŶtiŵeŶtos,͟ in Stella Bresciani; Marcia 
Naxara (eds.), Memória (res)sentimento: indagações sobre uma questão sensível. São 
Paulo: Editora da Unicamp, 15-36.  
Bataille, Geoƌge ;ϭϵϵϱͿ, ͞CoŶĐeƌŶiŶg the AĐĐouŶts GiǀeŶ ďǇ the ResideŶts of Hiƌoshiŵa,͟ in 
C. Caruth (ed.), Trauma: Explorations in Memory. Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 221-235. 
Beck, Ulrich; Giddens, Anthony; Lash, Scott (1994), Reflexive Modernization: Politics, 
Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford UP. 
BeŶjaŵiŶ, Walteƌ ;ϭϵϲϴͿ, ͞Thesis oŶ the PhilosophǇ of HistoƌǇ,͟ in Hannah Arendt (ed.), 
Illuminations. New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 253-264. 
Benjamin, Walter (1973), Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. 
London: NLB. 
Casey, Edward S. (1987), Remembering: A Phenomenological Study. Bloomington: Indiana 
UP. 
Cueto, Alonso (2006), A hora azul. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva.  
Daǀis, Natalie )eŵoŶ; “taƌŶ, RaŶdolf ;ϭϵϴϵͿ, ͞IŶtƌoduĐtioŶ: MeŵoƌǇ aŶd CouŶteƌ-Memory,͟ 
Representations, 26, 1-6. 
FouĐault, MiĐhel ;ϭϵϳϳͿ, ͞NietzsĐhe, GeŶealogǇ, HistoƌǇ,͟ in M. Foucault, Language, Counter-
memory, Practice. New York: Cornell UP, 139-164. 
Fƌeud, “igŵuŶd ;ϭϵϱϱͿ, ͞BeǇoŶd the Pleasuƌe PƌiŶĐiple,͟ in James Strachey (ed.), The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: 
Hogarth Press, vol. 18, 3-64 [1920]. 
RCCS Annual Review, 1, September 2009                                                                                                                       History, Memory and Forgetting 
 
93 
Friedländer, Saul (1992), Probing the Limits of RepreseŶtatioŶ: Nazisŵ aŶd the ͚FiŶal 
SolutioŶ͛. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP. 
Giddens, Anthony (1990), The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford UP. 
GƌossŵaŶ, JoŶathaŶ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ, ͞ViolêŶĐia e silêŶĐio: ReesĐƌeǀeŶdo o futuƌo,͟ História Oral, 
Revista da Associação Brasileira de História Oral, 3. 
Halbwachs, Maurice (1925), Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire. Paris: Felix Alcan [English 
translation: On collective memory. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992]. 
Halbwachs, Maurice; Alexandre, J.H. (1950), La mémoire collective. Ouvrage posthume 
publié. Paris: PUF [English translation: The collective memory. New York: Harper & Row/ 
Colophon Books, 1980]. 
Koselleck, Reinhart (1985), Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
Lash, “Đott ;ϭϵϵϴͿ, ͞Being After Time: Towards a Politics of Melancholy,͟ in S. Lash; A. Quick; 
R.H. Roberts, Time and Value. Oxford, UK / Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 147-161. 
McNamara, Robert S. (1996), In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: 
Vintage Books. 
Middleton, David; Edwards, Derek (1990), Collective Remembering. London: Newbury Park / 
Ca.: Sage Publications. 
Nora, Pierre (1984), Les lieux de mémoire. Paris: Gallimard. 
Pollak, MiĐhael ;ϭϵϴϵͿ, ͞Meŵóƌia, esƋueĐiŵeŶto e silêncio,͟ Estudos Históricos, 3, 3-15. 
Poƌtelli, AlessaŶdƌo ;ϭϵϵϲͿ, ͞O MassaĐƌe de Ciǀitella Val di Chiaƌa ;TosĐaŶa, Ϯϵ de juŶho de 
ϭϵϰϰͿ: ŵito e polítiĐa, luta e seŶso Đoŵuŵ,͟ in Marieta de Moares Ferreira; Janaína 
Amado (eds.), Usos e abusos da história oral. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio 
Vargas, 103-130.  
RiĐœuƌ, Paul ;ϮϬϬϬͿ, La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli. Paris: Seuil. 
Rousso, Henri (1987), La syndrome de Vichy. Paris: Seuil. 
“alǀatiĐi, “ilǀia ;ϮϬϬϱaͿ, ͞Meŵóƌias de gêŶeƌo: ƌefleǆões soďƌe a históƌia oƌal de ŵulheƌes,͟ 
História Oral, Revista da Associação Brasileira de História Oral, 8(1), 29-42. 
“alǀatiĐi, “ilǀia. ;ϮϬϬϱďͿ, ͞Naƌƌatiǀas de ǀiolêŶĐia Ŷo Kosoǀo do pós-gueƌƌa,͟ História Oral, 
Revista da Associação Brasileira de História Oral, 8(1), 115-127. 
“aŶtos, MǇƌiaŶ “epúlǀeda dos ;ϭϵϵϴͿ, ͞“oďƌe a autoŶoŵia de Ŷoǀas ideŶtidades Đoletiǀas: 
AlguŶs pƌoďleŵas teóƌiĐos,͟ Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 13(38), 151-165. 
Seligmann-“ilǀa, MaƌĐio ;ϮϬϬϬͿ, ͞A Históƌia Đoŵo Tƌauŵa,͟ Catástrofe e Representação: 
ensaios. São Paulo: Escuta, 73-98. 
Scheler, Max; Frings, M. S. (1994), Ressentiment. Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University 
Press. 
Taussig, Michael T. (1986), Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and 
Healing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
RCCS Annual Review, 1, September 2009                                                                                                                       History, Memory and Forgetting 
 
94 
Theidon, Kimberly (2004), Entre Prójimos: el conflicto armado interno y la política de la 
reconciliación en el Peru. Lima: IEP. 
Thompson, Paul (1992), A voz do passado. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra [Portuguese 
trnaslation of The Voice of the Past. Oxford: OUP, 1978]. 
White, Hayden (1987), The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical 
Representation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP. 
 
